Can local public hospitals survive without public financing?: a narrative review
Article information
Abstract
Purpose
This review examines the structural causes of persistent financial deficits in Korea’s local public hospitals and proposes a payment framework distinguishing public service obligations, capacity maintenance, and managerial losses.
Current concepts
Korea’s health care system developed around private providers and fee-for-service payment. Local public hospitals face high costs because of limited local demand, recruitment difficulties, fixed costs for essential services and standby capacity, and limited opportunities to generate revenue. Clinical activity and readiness to provide care are distinct performance dimensions, but current payment systems primarily reward services delivered. Accounting deficits should be classified as uncompensated public service costs, structural regional costs, standby and reserve capacity costs, or managerial losses. Payment reforms in England, Australia, and Germany incorporate fixed, regional, or capacity-related elements rather than linking payment solely to service volume. Korea’s accountable care hospital framework requires public hospitals to identify regional gaps and coordinate providers; this article conceptualizes the resources needed for this coordination as governance costs.
Discussion and conclusion
I propose 3- to 5-year strategic purchasing contracts based on standardized net costs and a 3-layer payment framework combining capacity and governance budgets, clinical activity payments, and quality and public performance incentives. Public financing should cover the standardized costs of contracted essential services, unavoidable regional structural costs, standby capacity, and governance functions. Managerial losses, however, should be attributed only after adjustment for these factors and relevant case mix and after systematic performance evaluation. Appropriate public financing is not an alternative to accountability but a prerequisite for it.
Introduction
Background
In Korea, the operating deficits of local public hospitals are commonly attributed to poor management. When net losses grow or local government subsidies expand, lax management, low productivity, and high labor costs are routinely blamed. The question “How long must taxes keep covering these deficits?” is asked repeatedly. From the standpoint of fiscal accountability and hospital operating efficiency, this question is legitimate; inefficient operation or irresponsible management cannot be justified merely because a hospital is public. However, were local public hospitals ever designed to operate on a purely self-supporting, independent accounting basis without public financing from national and local governments?
The private-sector orientation of Korean health care is not recent. Since the introduction of modern medicine, private providers have accounted for a large share of Korea’s health care capacity [1]. This historical pattern, combined with the subsequent expansion of national health insurance, produced an institutional trajectory that relied heavily on the growth of private providers rather than adequate expansion of the public supply base. The introduction of medical insurance in 1977 and achievement of universal medical insurance coverage in 1989 greatly improved financial access to health care. However, the supply system that absorbed the resulting increase in demand depended heavily on private-sector growth rather than large-scale expansion of public hospitals. Consequently, anticipated demand and profitability strongly shaped the distribution of health care institutions and the scope of services they provided [2].
In this context, Korea’s crisis in essential health care cannot be explained solely by an overall shortage of physicians or a relative shortage of beds. Beyond the total volume of health care resources, the relevant question is whether public mechanisms have adequately allocated resources to socially necessary functions and sustained the capacity to provide them. Private providers have contributed substantially to the rapid growth and accessibility of Korean health care. However, applying the same payment methods and management logic to care that the market supplies well and care that it cannot adequately supply fails to distinguish between these 2 types of service.
This article identifies the defining feature of this development path as the “asymmetric expansion of publicly pooled financing and privately provided care.” The system for pooling health care costs through national social insurance quickly became firmly established, yet the supply base that produced health care services relied heavily on private institutions. Under this structure, supply can expand rapidly in fields with high demand and profitability, but the capacity to provide essential care—care with small patient volumes that nevertheless requires round-the-clock readiness—is difficult to sustain reliably through providers’ voluntary choices alone [1,2].
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, Korea has 12.6 hospital beds per 1,000 population, markedly higher than the OECD average of 4.2, but only 2.7 practicing physicians per 1,000 population, lower than the OECD average of 3.9 [3]. The absolute number of beds is very large, but the central questions are who can continuously provide what type of care and where. Emergency care, trauma care, obstetric care, pediatric care, critical care, infectious disease response, and care for medically underserved areas must be available immediately when needed, even when demand is low or irregular. If a region performs 100 emergency operations per year, fee-for-service payment compensates those 100 operations. However, residents need a system in which surgery can be performed within a specified period on any day of the year. The cost of 100 operations differs from the cost of maintaining emergency surgical capacity on all 365 days.
Local public hospitals have simultaneously faced demands to “provide needed care even if it does not pay” and to “avoid running a deficit.” Just as a small rural school with few students is not expected to cover teachers’ salaries and operating costs solely through per-student tuition, supplying the essential care a community needs carries maintenance costs.
Objectives
This article does not argue that the government should cover every local public hospital deficit. Rather, it argues that losses arising from managerial inefficiency should be separated from the costs of public services demanded by society. The essential question should not be “how much of the deficit should be covered?” but “who should continuously supply the essential and public health services the population needs, at what cost, and how?” Drawing on existing literature and concerns the author has repeatedly encountered during more than a decade of running a local public hospital and formulating and implementing public health care policy, this article proposes new principles for Korea’s public hospital payment system.
The logic of independent accounting and classification of accounting losses by cause
As independent institutions, local public hospitals are expected under the independent accounting system to manage staffing appropriately, control costs, improve clinical productivity, and practice responsible management. However, “being accountable for management” and “having to cover all costs from the hospital’s own medical revenue” are not the same proposition. A private hospital can adjust its departments and bed capacity in line with demand and profitability. By contrast, if the sole public hospital in a region discontinues emergency, obstetric, or pediatric care, the hospital’s costs fall, but social costs—patients’ travel time, delayed treatment, the burden on family caregivers, and residents' anxiety—rise. The cost of supplying essential care includes not only the direct cost of care delivered but also the costs of maintaining essential personnel, standby readiness, and reserve capacity. Firefighters are not considered idle on days without fires because citizens need not merely a specific number of calls answered but the capacity for an immediate response whenever needed.
Accordingly, the accounting losses of local public hospitals should, at a minimum, be classified and evaluated separately as uncompensated public service costs, structural regional costs, standby and reserve capacity costs, or managerial losses. Public financing should adequately compensate uncompensated public service costs and standby and reserve capacity costs. It should also compensate structural regional costs that remain unavoidable under efficient operation because of limited local demand, difficulty recruiting health care workers, and diseconomies of scale, for example through a regional adjustment factor. However, avoidable costs arising from an institution's own management decisions under the same regional conditions should not be compensated automatically. Table 1 presents this conceptual classification. Applying it to accounting records requires separate tracking of the direct costs of each contracted public service obligation (PSO) and reasonably allocable indirect costs, followed by benchmarking against the standardized net costs of comparable hospitals adjusted for region and case mix. Managerial losses should be defined as costs attributable to organizational or workforce inefficiency, low productivity, or managerial failure that remain after adjustment for PSOs, unavoidable regional structural factors, capacity-maintenance needs, case mix, and other relevant factors. These costs require a separate systematic performance evaluation; a residual accounting loss alone should not be classified as a managerial loss.
Why are local public hospitals structurally disadvantaged?
Local public hospitals face both structural cost disadvantages and constraints on revenue. Their costs are high, whereas the current payment system provides relatively few ways to increase revenue. Table 2 summarizes the conceptual differences in operating conditions between general private hospitals and local public hospitals.
First, the cost of securing a health care workforce is high in medically underserved areas. Because of unfavorable local conditions, including limited employment opportunities for spouses and limitations in children’s education, housing, career development, and collaborative practice environments, higher pay and housing or on-call incentives may be needed. The departure of a single specialist increases the on-call burden on the remaining staff and can trigger further turnover and gaps in care. Difficulty securing a health care workforce raises recruitment premiums and on-call burdens, creating a vicious cycle of higher operating costs, reduced patient volume, larger losses, and further staff departures.
Second, essential care involves low and irregular demand but high fixed costs. A volume of 100 emergency operations per year averages only 0.27 cases per day, but because the timing of these operations is unpredictable, facilities and staff capable of performing surgery must be maintained year-round. Activity volume and supply capacity are distinct concepts.
Third, small regional hospitals have difficulty achieving economies of scale. Emergency departments, operating rooms, intensive care units, laboratories, imaging equipment, and health information systems require substantial fixed costs regardless of patient volume. The transfer of severely ill patients to hospitals outside the region reduces both patient volume and clinical experience, making it still harder to secure personnel and investment.
Fourth, as public institutions, local public hospitals have limited flexibility to adjust their workforce and compensation systems. Compliance with employment procedures and labor-relations standards for public institutions is a proper obligation. Compared with private hospitals, however, local public hospitals face greater constraints in redeploying staff as demand changes and in adjusting compensation to reflect duties and performance. Applying similar seniority- and pay-step-based wage systems across occupations with different professional characteristics and labor-market conditions can increase labor costs as tenure rises without adequately reflecting job value or the difficulty of recruiting particular staff. Among nurses, this can create a paradox: total labor costs are high because of increasing pay for long-tenured staff, yet starting salaries for newly hired nurses remain uncompetitive in the local labor market. Delays in filling positions reduce bed occupancy and patient volume, further worsening revenue and perpetuating a vicious cycle. In addition, when compensation and job security are insufficiently linked to job performance and organizational contribution, and local governments impose rigid staffing quotas, hospitals cannot easily deploy personnel where needed. The labor-cost problem of local public hospitals should therefore be assessed not only through aggregate staffing and wage levels but also through organizational flexibility, including whether compensation matches job duties and staff can be deployed rationally.
Fifth, Korea’s fee-for-service system creates an economic incentive for revenue to rise with service volume. The Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service explains that fee-for-service pricing, which assigns a price to each service, can “encourage brief, frequent visits rather than fewer, more thorough examinations” [4]. The revenue problem of local public hospitals has been summarized as a low-revenue structure resulting from conditions that make it difficult to generate sufficient service volume, combined with a low share of noncovered care [5]. The same source reports a cost-recovery rate for health insurance-covered care of approximately 80%–90%. It explains that although general health care institutions can offset losses in the covered segment through noncovered care and other means, local public hospitals have a relatively low share of and revenue from noncovered care [5].
This pattern does not reflect ethical failings by individual private hospitals; it arises from the incentives built into the payment system. To achieve the same financial balance as private hospitals, local public hospitals are also pressured to attract more patients, increase testing and procedures, and expand profitable noncovered care. Yet public hospitals are expected to reduce unnecessary utilization and patients' financial burden and to set a community standard for appropriate care by providing necessary services at an appropriate level.
The low profitability of local public hospitals cannot be attributed entirely to this practice pattern. Nevertheless, their relatively limited reliance on increasing patient volume and noncovered revenue can itself create a revenue disadvantage under a fee-for-service payment structure in which revenue rises with service volume. Their low profitability may therefore reflect not only managerial inefficiency but also a payment system that does not adequately compensate the value of appropriate care that public hospitals are expected to provide.
Sixth, the value of reserve capacity is not adequately reflected in accounting or payment systems. Reserve beds that can be converted immediately under infectious disease or disaster-response plans appear to have low occupancy in hospital accounts, but they are a social asset that supports resilience. Not every empty bed can be counted as reserve capacity; however, the level of crisis-response readiness required by the government should be clearly defined in a contract, and actual surge capacity should be evaluated.
Empirical data also support the combined disadvantages of lower revenue and higher costs. Bed occupancy rates and the numbers of inpatients and outpatients per 100 beds at local public hospitals were similar to or slightly lower than those at private hospitals of comparable size, suggesting that utilization was generally sound. Nevertheless, medical revenue and average outpatient and inpatient charges per patient were markedly lower at local public hospitals [5,6]. In 2019, the ratio of medical costs to medical revenue was 115.1% for local public hospitals and 93.0% for comparable private hospitals [6]. These indicators do not fully adjust for hospital size, patient severity and case mix, departmental composition, or regional characteristics. They should therefore be interpreted as basic evidence of structural vulnerability rather than proof that all losses represent the cost of public service; more rigorous adjusted analyses are needed. Performance evaluation should consider not only how much a hospital earned but also how it delivered care. After adjustment for case mix and severity, a lower volume of tests and procedures and a lower share of noncovered care, combined with equivalent or better clinical outcomes and patient safety, would indicate that lower revenue does not necessarily reflect poorer performance. Conversely, lower charges caused by underprovision of necessary tests and treatment cannot be justified as public-service value. Billing and practice indicators, including tests and procedures per patient, the share of noncovered care, and standardized treatment costs [5,6], should therefore be evaluated alongside outcome and quality indicators such as readmission rates [7,8]. A public hospital should provide sufficient necessary care while reducing unnecessary care, not simply provide less care. Accordingly, the “Financial effect of appropriate care” row in Table 2 indicates that appropriate care and less reliance on noncovered services, although socially desirable, can appear as a relative revenue disadvantage under the current volume- and revenue-centered payment structure.
In this light, the approach to supporting local public hospitals should also be reconsidered. These hospitals have operated within a revenue structure not substantially different from that of private hospitals, and their management performance has been evaluated mainly in terms of medical revenue and profit or loss. In contrast, no adequate system has been established to calculate and prospectively compensate the costs of public services and essential-care supply capacity by function [5,6]. Public financing has instead been provided piecemeal for facilities and equipment, labor costs, or individual policy programs. The need to establish a payment and compensation system, together with principles for supporting recurrent operating costs, that reflects the functions and roles of local public hospitals has been repeatedly noted [5,6]. Such fragmented support makes it difficult to build essential-care supply capacity over the long term, whereas after-the-fact deficit compensation makes it difficult to distinguish structural costs from managerial inefficiency. This contradiction—evaluating local public hospitals according to management principles similar to those applied to private hospitals while failing to systematically compensate their required public functions—must be resolved.
Korea has already made policy efforts to institutionalize measurement and compensation of the costs incurred by local public hospitals in performing their public functions. In 2014, the Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted A Study on the Measurement of Public Service Costs and Management Consulting for Local Public Hospitals, which sought to classify the public-interest functions of local public hospitals and systematically measure their public-interest costs to establish objective criteria for public financing [9]. This study represented the first systematic national-level attempt to separately identify costs associated with the public functions of local public hospitals and establish a basis for function-specific financing. However, its cost measurements were not institutionalized in a standardized national compensation system. This article builds on that study but extends its policy approach beyond measuring public-interest costs: it classifies accounting losses as uncompensated public service costs, structural regional costs, standby and reserve capacity costs, or managerial losses and proposes corresponding financial responsibilities and payment principles for each.
Implications of international hospital payment systems
The health systems of England, Australia, and Germany differ substantially, and Korea should not adopt any one system wholesale. Each has distinct aims and design features. However, all 3 systems avoid tying hospital payment solely to the volume of care delivered by incorporating fixed, regional, or capacity-related elements.
To address the limitations of activity-based payment, England introduced Aligned Payment and Incentive, which combines fixed elements with activity-based payment [10,11]. Australia relies principally on activity-based funding but applies block funding to small rural and regional hospitals, thereby securing the functions of hospitals for which economies of scale are difficult to achieve [12–14]. Through its 2025 hospital reform, Germany is also changing direction by introducing a capacity-maintenance payment (Vorhaltevergütung) that compensates not only for care delivered but also for readiness to provide essential care [15,16]. Table 3 summarizes the implications of these key systems.
The significance of these examples lies neither in copying one system outright nor in treating them as a single policy model. England exemplifies a blended payment model combining fixed and activity-based elements; Australia applies separate block funding to some rural and regional hospitals; and Germany is reforming its system to explicitly compensate for capacity maintenance [10–16]. The common implication for Korea is that hospital payment should not be determined solely by actual service volume. It should also account for fixed, regional, and capacity-related factors tailored to the service characteristics and local conditions.
Beyond deficit compensation: toward fair payment for necessary public health care
Financing policy for local public hospitals should begin with the health care needs of local residents rather than a hospital's net loss for the period. The World Health Organization defines strategic purchasing as deciding what to buy, for whom, and how, based on the population's health care needs [17].
First, the scope of essential and public health services to be publicly guaranteed must be clarified. Based on the regional population structure, disease burden, degree of medical vulnerability, and distribution of health care institutions, the services and supply capacity to be maintained should be defined in contracts. Capacity-maintenance payment should apply not to every function performed by a public hospital but specifically to essential care that the market alone cannot reliably supply.
Second, compensation should be based on the standardized net cost required for an efficiently operated hospital to provide the contracted services, not on reimbursement of actual deficits after the fact. Standardized net cost is the standard cost of efficiently maintaining the contracted services and supply capacity minus health insurance revenue and other purpose-designated revenue generated by that function. Additional structural regional costs that remain unavoidable under efficient operation should be covered through mechanisms such as a regional adjustment factor, whereas costs caused by inefficiency at individual hospitals should be excluded. Clear settlement principles should be established in advance to prevent double compensation through both capacity-maintenance and clinical-activity payments.
Third, rather than unifying payment under a single method, payment should be differentiated by function. A multilayer payment framework is desirable: a base budget for maintaining supply capacity, activity-based health insurance payment for care delivered, and performance payment for quality of care and public performance. This approach does not require choosing between global budgeting and fee-for-service payment but combines the methods that best reward each function. Table 4 summarizes these payment principles.
Fourth, accountable care hospitals should receive separate compensation for regional linkage, coordination, and collaboration. Sustaining the essential-care supply system requires both clinical care and organization and coordination of regional health care resources. This governance function should therefore be evaluated and compensated as part of the contracted public service.
Fifth, contracts should preferably be medium- to long-term strategic purchasing agreements lasting 3–5 years rather than single-year subsidy programs. The government should consistently compensate the standardized net cost of contracted essential care, while hospitals should be accountable for contracted services and performance.
Finally, once contracted public services, standby and reserve capacity, and regional structural costs that remain unavoidable under efficient operation have been fully compensated, managerial accountability should be enforced more strictly. Any remaining accounting loss should not automatically be classified as a managerial loss. Only costs attributable to organizational or workforce inefficiency or managerial failure after systematic adjustment for case mix, severity, departmental structure, regional conditions, and contracted supply capacity should receive that classification.
The accountable care hospital system and governance costs
Accordingly, the basic capacity budget proposed above should include not only the costs of essential personnel, facilities, and capacity maintenance but also the standard cost of the governance function that links and coordinates the regional health care system. Here, governance cost is not a new category of accounting loss but a function-based cost concept intended to make visible the nonclinical organizing and coordinating functions required of accountable care hospitals.
Since 2018, accountable care hospitals have been designated to perform regional linkage, cooperation, and coordination functions for essential care, but financing remains focused on dedicated staff and individual project budgets. Fee-for-service payment does not adequately compensate tasks such as assessing regional essential-care needs, operating consultative bodies, developing joint clinical guidelines, providing education and training, building referral and back-referral systems, and coordinating providers.
The current public health care cooperation network project should therefore be redesigned as an element of the basic capacity budget that compensates the governance function rather than maintained as a separate program. A system is needed that clearly defines the scope and standard cost of the planning, coordinating, and linking functions that accountable care hospitals must perform, evaluates performance, and provides stable compensation accordingly [18].
This article interprets the accountable care hospital system introduced in 2018 as a policy designed to make public hospitals the central connecting axis of local and regional health care systems [19,20]. The system does not require the state to operate every health care institution directly; rather, it organizes regional health care resources and builds cooperative systems around public hospitals in a context in which private institutions account for most providers. Yim [21] similarly emphasized that public hospitals, as accountable care hospitals, must have the capacity to coordinate cooperation among regional health care institutions.
A local accountable care hospital should serve not simply as a hospital that treats many patients but as the central institution that identifies gaps in regional essential care, links public health centers, fire and emergency services, private hospitals, and local governments, and coordinates referral and back-referral systems within the regional health care system. In addition to providing high-complexity care, a regional accountable care hospital should support local accountable care hospitals and serve as a hub that coordinates collaboration and patient flow across the region.
This linking and coordinating role does not confer authority to direct or control other health care institutions; it fosters cooperation among institutions based on transparent information and shared performance goals. Governance costs should therefore be understood not as a privilege granted to public hospitals but as fair compensation for a public function necessary to sustain the regional essential-care system.
This policy was subsequently developed further, with metropolitan and provincial governments, public health care support groups, and accountable care hospitals as the main implementing actors. Development moved toward a “policy governance” structure centered on metropolitan and provincial public health care committees and a “care-delivery governance” structure centered on external consultative councils for essential health care [20]. Policy governance determines regional priorities and plans, whereas care-delivery governance is responsible for linkage and cooperation among providers and for program implementation based on those priorities and plans [20]. This approach not only strengthens the clinical function of public hospitals but also expands public health care from a residual concept centered on vulnerable populations and areas of market failure to a universal concept aimed at guaranteeing essential care for the entire population while organizing the regional health care system as a whole [20].
Just as a trained standing army with an established chain of command can be critical to the outcome of a war, publicly accountable health care requires a core supply base that can respond immediately and in accordance with policy objectives. This article uses the “standing army” of public health care as an exploratory metaphor for this function. The metaphor does not imply that public hospitals should monopolize public health care. It describes an always-available public base that treats residents and cooperates with private institutions during ordinary periods but can rapidly adapt its functions to the demands of national and local governments during infectious disease outbreaks, disasters, or gaps in care.
Private health care institutions can also be important suppliers of public health care and already play this role in practice. However, the essential-care system for which the state bears ultimate responsibility requires a core supply base that can continue to operate according to state policy directives even as market conditions and the managerial decisions of individual institutions change.
This does not mean that public hospitals alone should receive public financing. Capacity-maintenance payments can be applied to private institutions under the same principle, provided they have the capacity and public accountability to reliably provide contracted essential care. However, this article argues that to fulfill its ultimate supply responsibility without depending solely on whether and how private institutions choose to participate, the state needs at least a minimal public supply base that it can operate directly through policy.
Responsibility for deficits does not rest with the system alone: self-reform and managerial accountability of local public hospitals
Reform of local public hospitals should be guided by mutual accountability between government and public hospitals. Government should consistently compensate the standardized net costs of contracted essential and public health services and supply capacity. Local public hospitals, in turn, should use those resources efficiently to meet contracted performance requirements. Clear compensation for public-service costs and an end to automatic ex post deficit coverage are prerequisites for accountable management.
This principle follows from the cause-based classification of accounting losses proposed in this article. Once uncompensated public service costs, unavoidable structural regional costs, and standby and reserve capacity costs are separately and adequately compensated, public status alone cannot justify every remaining deficit. Managerial losses should be identified through a separate systematic evaluation as costs attributable to organizational or workforce inefficiency or managerial failure after adjustment for these factors and for related conditions such as case mix and severity. It should not be defined as the residual accounting balance.
Local public hospitals must also continue to pursue organizational innovation and management improvement. Ongoing management tasks include rationalizing departmental operations, improving workforce productivity, enhancing procurement and inventory management, increasing the efficiency of bed management, and improving physician workforce management. A job-based compensation system may also be considered, but individual hospitals cannot easily resolve this issue alone; standardized job-evaluation tools and institutional support are needed. Because introducing job-based pay under a fixed total labor-cost ceiling can reduce some employees' wages and provoke labor–management conflict, safeguards to increase acceptability must be introduced concurrently. These may include transparent job-value evaluation criteria, adequate labor–management consultation, phased implementation, and wage protections or transitional measures.
Physician shortages can distort the bargaining structure of local public hospitals. Market-level compensation may sometimes be necessary to secure scarce specialists, but higher compensation should be accompanied by commensurate accountability and performance evaluation. Contracting and evaluation systems should reflect contributions to essential care, on-call and emergency response duties, clinical performance, and organizational contributions.
Sustainable public hospital operation also requires management leadership with professional expertise and accountability. Hospital directors should have reliable tenure and authority, accompanied by clear accountability for contracted public services and management-improvement goals. Systematic identification and training of leadership candidates, together with support for management capacity, are needed to sustain accountable management [22].
Ultimately, financial reform of local public hospitals should clarify both the scale and method of required support while moving toward clearer contracts and stricter accountability. The government should fairly compensate necessary public services and supply capacity and the regional structural costs that remain unavoidable even under efficient operation. In contrast, local public hospitals should use those resources efficiently to demonstrate both public value and managerial performance.
The proposed multilayer payment framework linking accounting-loss classification, the contracted payment structure, and mutual accountability for local public hospitals is presented in Figure 1.
Why public hospitals: the nation’s core public health care supply base
One fundamental question remains: if national and local governments guarantee essential public health services and cover their costs, why are public hospitals necessary? Could private hospitals provide the same functions under contracts with appropriate compensation?
The ability of private hospitals to perform public functions and the need for public hospitals should not be treated as mutually exclusive. Private health care institutions should participate broadly in public health care under contracts with appropriate compensation. At the same time, the state should maintain a public hospital network with sufficient scale and capacity to operate under policy direction in any circumstances. Private participation should complement, not replace, the state's core public supply base.
The role of public hospitals as the state’s core supply base does not excuse inefficiency. On the contrary, precisely because they are a direct policy instrument of the state, public hospitals require greater organizational capacity, clear lines of accountability, and rigorous performance evaluation. If the state pays fairly for capacity maintenance and governance costs, public hospitals should, in turn, reliably provide contracted services, disclose their costs and performance, and be subject to stricter public accountability.
Public hospitals also have roles beyond crisis response. They allow the state to pilot appropriate-care models, standardized costs, essential-care service packages, and new payment systems. Public hospitals can disclose health care costs transparently, test whether quality can be maintained while reducing tests and procedures per patient and reliance on noncovered care, and demonstrate collaborative-care models with local private institutions. They should therefore serve not as residual suppliers in the health care market but as benchmarks for health policy and sites for empirical testing.
During the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, public hospitals served as key hubs in the national infectious disease response. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has also identified serving as a hub treatment hospital during infectious disease outbreaks and national disasters as a key role of local public hospitals [23]. This experience demonstrates the policy value of crisis-time conversion and response capacity, which ordinary activity volume alone cannot adequately capture. A policy contradiction arises when the state relies on public hospitals as a mobilizable base during crises but fails to adequately cover the costs of readiness and conversion capacity in peacetime.
The value of this core supply base cannot be assessed solely by activity volume on the day of a crisis. Just as peacetime training, command structures, and maintenance of equipment and personnel are costs of national security, a public hospital’s capacity to convert beds for use during infectious disease outbreaks, its emergency-surgery standby system, its essential workforce, and its role in the regional health care safety net should not be evaluated solely by same-day patient numbers and bed-occupancy rates. Preparedness and the capacity to act immediately when needed are themselves public assets.
Limitations and future research
Further work is needed to translate this article’s proposals into practice: comparisons of costs and revenues between local public hospitals and comparable private hospitals after adjustment for case mix, severity, and departmental structure; calculations of minimum supply units and standard staffing for each essential-care service; and development of regional adjustment factors. Pilot programs should also precede full implementation and evaluate changes in days of essential-care service interruption, regional avoidable mortality, service volume, quality of care, and total health care costs before and after introduction of a capacity budget. The proposals in this article are not a finalized, validated payment formula but a policy starting point for changing what is measured and paid for.
As a narrative policy article, this article proposes an analytical framework comprising a cause-based classification of accounting losses in local public hospitals and the concept of governance costs. It also presents the principle that compensation methods should differ according to the nature of costs and functions. However, it does not empirically estimate the magnitude of each cost category or the fiscal effects of these compensation methods. Further research is particularly needed on methods for separating PSO costs, structural regional costs, standby and reserve capacity costs, and managerial inefficiency in actual accounting data and adjusting for related factors such as case mix.
Conclusion
If local public hospitals are required to provide regional essential care, respond to infectious diseases and disasters, treat medically vulnerable populations, and function as a regional health care safety net without separate compensation for these costs, they cannot be expected to operate sustainably on medical revenue alone. This is not, however, an argument for covering every deficit.
Costs that are fundamentally different in nature have thus far been evaluated as a single figure called the “deficit.” However, uncompensated public service costs, structural regional costs, standby and reserve capacity costs, and managerial losses attributable to inefficiency after systematic evaluation are distinct for policy purposes and should not be treated alike. Financial reform of public hospitals must begin by classifying and measuring these costs and then applying the appropriate payment principle and financial responsibility to each.
Korea’s health care system has achieved high accessibility through the growth of private providers and national health insurance. However, if essential care that the market does not adequately supply continues to operate under the same payment principles as other care, the sustainability of regional essential care will remain difficult to secure. A public hospital should not select services solely on the basis of profitability; it should consistently provide the care its community needs.
This article has argued that volume-centered payment alone cannot sustain this role and has proposed a multilayer payment framework combining a basic capacity budget, clinical activity payments, and payments for quality of care and public performance. It has also proposed that uncompensated public service costs, structural regional costs unavoidable even under efficient operation, and standby and reserve capacity costs be reflected in the compensation system and that the linkage and coordination functions of accountable care hospitals be conceptualized and compensated as separate governance costs.
At the same time, public hospitals should not be exempt from accountability. In return for adequate compensation for contracted public services, supply capacity, and unavoidable structural regional costs, hospitals should be subject to stricter management accountability and organizational reform for managerial losses attributable to the hospital and its management, as determined through systematic evaluation adjusted for relevant factors. Fair compensation for public services and strict management accountability are not opposing concepts but the 2 pillars of sustainable public hospital operation.
Ultimately, the core reform for local public hospitals is not a choice between support and accountability but the establishment of a new payment principle that pays a fair cost for necessary public services and demands stricter accountability in return. The sustainability of public hospitals depends not on how much of a deficit is covered but on how much and by what method society pays for the roles it demands and what degree of accountability it requires in return. Fair compensation does not weaken accountability; it is the precondition that makes accountability possible.
Notes
Conflict of interest
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.
Funding
None.
Data availability
Not applicable.
